GSG-11 Arrangements for the Termination of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency

ⓘ This includes nuclear and radiological emergencies and conventional emergencies such as fires, releases of hazardous chemicals, storms or earthquakes.

ⓘ This includes situations for which prompt action is warranted to mitigate the effects of a perceived hazard.

nuclear or radiological emergency³. An emergency in which there is, or is perceived to be, a hazard due to:

• (a) The energy resulting from a nuclear chain reaction or from the decay of the products of a chain reaction;

• (b) Radiation exposure.

ⓘ Existing exposure situations include exposure to natural background radiation that is amenable to control; exposure due to residual radioactive material that derives from past practices that were never subject to regulatory control; and exposure due to residual radioactive material deriving from a nuclear or radiological emergency after an emergency has been declared to be ended.

An emergency that does not involve a significant release of radioactive material to the environment, and thus does not result in exposures of the public in the longer term due to residual radioactive material (e.g. the fuel damage incident at Paks nuclear power plant, the accidental overexposures in Panama and the radiological accident in Nueva Aldea), might not necessarily result in an emergency exposure situation. Such emergencies can be terminated in a way in which the facility, the activity and the source can ultimately be managed as a planned exposure situation. The planned exposure situation may be associated with normal operation, with cleanup and decommissioning, or with the ending of the operational life of the source. In terms of public exposure, such emergencies are not expected to result in an exposure situation that is different from the one that existed before the emergency. The decision to terminate an emergency of this type also delineates the beginning of a planned exposure situation. In such cases, within the context of this Safety Guide, the phrase ‘transition to a planned exposure situation’ is used.

An emergency involving a significant release of radioactive material to the environment (e.g. the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, the Fukushima Daiichi accident, the Goiânia radiological accident) will result in an emergency exposure situation. In such emergencies, the public may be exposed in the longer term because of the presence of residual radioactive material in the environment. Such situations are eventually managed as existing exposure situations. The termination of such emergencies is possible after a period of time that allows for the transition to an existing exposure situation to take place. The decision to terminate an emergency of this type also means entering into an existing exposure situation. In such cases, within the context of this Safety Guide, the phrase ‘transition to an existing exposure situation’ is used.

The termination of an exposure situation in which contamination has occurred due to a human activity but which is not an emergency exposure situation. This scenario would include, for example, situations arising from legacy sites or planned discharges of radioactive material to the environment.

Arrangements for managing existing exposure situations and long term remediation, as well as arrangements for the decommissioning of accident damaged facilities at which permanent shutdown is warranted; guidance relevant to such situations can be found in Refs [16–19]. However, the basic concepts and approaches contained in this Safety Guide will support, within the context of overall emergency preparedness, planning for the management of the existing exposure situation after the termination of the nuclear or radiological emergency.

early protective action. A protective action in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency that can be implemented within days to weeks and still be effective.

ⓘ The most common early protective actions are relocation and longer term restriction of the consumption of food potentially affected by contamination.

mitigatory action. Immediate action by the operator or other party:

• (a) To reduce the potential for conditions to develop that would result in exposure or a release of radioactive material requiring emergency response actions on the site or off the site; or

• (b) To mitigate source conditions that may result in exposure or a release of radioactive material requiring emergency response actions on the site or off the site.

urgent protective action. A protective action in the event of a nuclear or radiological emergency which must be taken promptly (usually within hours to a day) in order to be effective, and the effectiveness of which will be markedly reduced if it is delayed.

ⓘ Urgent protective actions include iodine thyroid blocking, evacuation, short term sheltering, actions to reduce inadvertent ingestion, decontamination of individuals and prevention of ingestion of food, milk or drinking water possibly with contamination.

ⓘ A precautionary urgent protective action is an urgent protective action taken before or shortly after a release of radioactive material, or an exposure, on the basis of the prevailing conditions to avoid or to minimize severe deterministic effects.”

“other response action. An emergency response action other than a protective action.

ⓘ The most common other response actions are: medical examination, consultation and treatment; registration and longer term medical follow-up; providing psychological counselling; and public information and other actions for mitigating non-radiological consequences and for public reassurance.”

Urgent response phase: The period of time, within the emergency response phase, from the detection of conditions warranting emergency response actions that must be taken promptly in order to be effective until the completion of all such actions. Such emergency response actions include mitigatory actions by the operator and urgent protective actions on the site and off the site. The urgent response phase may last from hours to days depending on the nature and scale of the nuclear or radiological emergency.¹¹

Early response phase: The period of time, within the emergency response phase, from which a radiological situation is already characterized sufficiently well that a need for taking early protective actions and other response actions can be identified, until the completion of all such actions. The early response phase may last from days to weeks depending on the nature and scale of the nuclear or radiological emergency.¹²

The transition from the emergency exposure situation will likely take place at different geographical areas or at different parts of the site at different points in time. The situation in some geographical areas or some parts of the site might therefore continue to be managed as a nuclear or radiological emergency, while the situation in other areas might be managed as a planned exposure situation or an existing exposure situation, as appropriate.

Some of the prerequisites set out in this section are to be fulfilled by the operating organization in addition to responsible off-site response organizations. To a great extent, the transition from the emergency exposure situation in areas off the site will be subject to confirmation by the operating organization that the respective prerequisites¹⁶ have been fulfilled on the site.

The basis and rationale for the termination of the emergency and an overview of the actions taken and the restrictions imposed;

The need to adjust imposed restrictions, to continue protective actions or to introduce new protective actions, as well as the expected duration of these actions and restrictions;

Any necessary modifications to people’s personal behaviours and habits;

Options for the implementation of self-help actions²⁵, as appropriate;

The need for continued environmental monitoring and source monitoring after the termination of the emergency;

The need for continued efforts to restore services and workplaces;

Radiological health hazards associated with the new exposure situation.

The circumstances that led to the emergency have been analysed, corrective actions have been identified and an action plan has been developed for the implementation of corrective actions by the respective authorities, as applicable, in relation to the facility, activity or source involved in the emergency. However, in some cases, the formal analysis and development of the action plan might be a lengthy process. Therefore, consideration should be given to establishing administrative procedures that limit or prevent the use or handling of the source until the circumstances that led to the emergency have been better understood, with the aim of preventing unnecessary delays in the termination of the emergency.

Conditions have been assessed to ensure compliance with the safe and secure handling of the source²⁶ involved in the emergency in accordance with the national requirements set forth for the respective planned exposure situation²⁷.

Compliance has been confirmed with the dose limits for public exposures in planned exposure situations and with the requirements for medical exposure established in Section 3 of GSR Part 3 [3].

Justified and optimized actions have been taken to meet the national generic criteria established to enable the transition to an existing exposure situation, with account taken of the generic criteria provided in appendix II to GSR Part 7 [2], and it has been verified that the assessed residual doses²⁸ approach the lower bound of the reference level for an emergency exposure situation (see paras 4.52–4.69).

Areas have been delineated that are not permitted to be inhabited and where it is not feasible to carry out social and economic activity. This delineation relates to areas that, earlier in the emergency response, were subject to evacuation and/or relocation, and/or where specific restrictions were imposed that will continue to be implemented after the termination of the emergency.

For these delineated areas, administrative and other provisions have been established to monitor compliance with any restrictions imposed.

Before the termination of the emergency, a strategy has been developed for the restoration of infrastructure, workplaces and public services (e.g. public transportation, shops and markets, schools, kindergartens, health care facilities, and police and firefighting services) necessary to support normal living conditions in the affected areas, such as those areas in which evacuations or relocations were carried out.

A mechanism and the means for continued communication and consultation with all interested parties, including local communities, have been put in place.

Before the termination of the emergency, any change or transfer of authority and responsibilities from the emergency response organization to organizations responsible for the long term recovery operations has been completed.

The sharing of any information and data that were gathered during the emergency exposure situation and that are relevant for long term planning has been organized among the relevant organizations and authorities.

Development of a long term monitoring strategy in relation to residual contamination has been initiated.

A programme for longer term medical follow-up for the registered individuals (see para. 3.15) has been developed.

A strategy for mental health and psychosocial support for the affected population has been developed.

Consideration has been given to the compensation of victims for damage due to the emergency so as to provide for public reassurance, notwithstanding the fact that the processes for compensation will extend after the emergency is terminated.

Administrative arrangements, legal provisions and regulatory provisions have been put in place or are being put in place for the management of the existing exposure situation, including provisions for the allocation of the necessary financial, technical and human resources.

“The government shall make adequate preparations to anticipate, prepare for, respond to and recover from a nuclear or radiological emergency at the operating organization, local, regional and national levels, and also, as appropriate, at the international level. These preparations shall include adopting legislation and establishing regulations for effectively governing the preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency at all levels” (para. 4.5 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The emergency arrangements shall include clear assignment of responsibilities and authorities, and shall provide for coordination…in all phases of the response” (para 6.5 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The government shall ensure that all roles and responsibilities for preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency are clearly allocated in advance among operating organizations, the regulatory body and response organizations” (para. 4.7 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The government shall ensure that response organizations, operating organizations and the regulatory body have the necessary human, financial and other resources, in view of their expected roles and responsibilities and the assessed hazards, to prepare for and to deal with both radiological and non-radiological consequences of a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether the emergency occurs within or beyond national borders” (para. 4.8 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for operations in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency to be appropriately managed” (Requirement 6 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The arrangements for delegation and/or transfer of authority shall be specified in the relevant emergency plans, together with arrangements for notifying all appropriate parties of the transfer” (para. 6.6 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

The legal and regulatory framework governing preparedness and response in respect of the transition phase of a nuclear or radiological emergency;

The framework for radiation protection and safety relating to longer term issues associated with an existing exposure situation, to ensure a smooth transition and to avoid unnecessary delays due to legal and regulatory issues.

The positions to be staffed to implement the necessary activities in the transition phase and, over the longer term, in a planned exposure situation or an existing exposure situation, as appropriate;

The provision of ‘just in time’ training to emergency workers and helpers;

The mobilization of resources among relevant organizations.

The types of information and data from the emergency response phase that may be of relevance to the transition phase as well as in the longer term should be clearly identified.

Relevant organizations that will need access to such information and data should be identified.

A mechanism should be established to record such information and data during the emergency response phase and to exchange this information and data efficiently between the relevant organizations, taking into account the need for continued data collection and sharing in the transition phase as well as in the longer term.

For a general emergency at a facility in emergency preparedness category I or II, leading to a significant release of radioactive material to the environment (e.g. the Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011, for which a case study is given in Annex I), termination of the emergency will take place through transition to an existing exposure situation.

For a site area emergency at a facility in emergency preparedness category I or II and for a facility emergency at a facility in emergency preparedness category I, II or III, termination of the emergency will take place through transition to a planned exposure situation (e.g. the Paks fuel damage incident in 2003, for which a case study is given in Annex I). In this context, the planned exposure situation may be associated with a continuation of normal operation, or with cleanup and decommissioning, or with the ending of the operational life of the source involved in the emergency, as applicable. However, postulated nuclear or radiological emergencies within these classes are not expected to result in a different exposure situation for the public compared with the situation that existed before the emergency.

An alert at a facility in emergency preparedness category I, II or III will be followed by the resumption of normal operations in a planned exposure situation.

Other nuclear or radiological emergency covers a broad spectrum of emergencies involving activities or acts in emergency preparedness category IV and may occur at any location (see para. 4.19 of GSR Part 7 [2]). In this class, depending on the type of emergency, termination of the emergency is envisaged by transition to either an existing exposure situation or a planned exposure situation. For example:

An emergency without a release of radioactive material to the environment is to be terminated by transition to the same exposure situation for the affected public that existed before the emergency (e.g. the radiological incident in Hueypoxtla, Mexico, in 2013, for which a case study is given in Annex I). The recovered source may be brought back to normal operation or its operational life may be ended. In the latter case, the source may be managed as radioactive waste under the requirements for a planned exposure situation.

An emergency with a release of radioactive material to the environment resulting in significant residual radioactivity in the environment is to be terminated by transition to an existing exposure situation (e.g. the Goiânia accident of 1987 [12], for which a case study is given in Annex I).

The likely inability to predict accurately when, where and what the actual impact of the nuclear or radiological emergency might be;

The complexity of potential recovery efforts;

The potential impact of non-radiological factors, such as public concerns and the political situation, on decision making at the time of the emergency.³⁰

The processes and methods to be used in the transition phase, including the designation of any necessary decision aiding tools;

The parties that will need to be consulted on the inputs necessary for the justification and optimization processes;

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities for the justification and optimization processes.

An emergency involving large scale contamination resulting in exposures of the public due to long-lasting residual radioactive material in the environment will result in longer term exposures, which are expected to decrease with time. The time dependence of the reduction of the residual doses will depend on various circumstances, including the effectiveness and the efficiency of the implementation of the protection strategy. Successful implementation of the protective strategy will lead to residual doses approaching an effective dose of 20 mSv per year, which is expected to facilitate efforts aimed at enabling the transition to an existing exposure situation.

An emergency involving a dangerous source that does not result in long-lasting residual radioactive material in the environment will not result in a need for the residual dose to be gradually reduced, as in the example in para. 4.56(a). As such, while the reference level for the emergency exposure situation may be selected from the range proposed (see para. 4.52) for the purpose of the response, once the source is recovered safely, the concept of the reference level will no longer apply, as the situation will return to a planned exposure situation.

An effective dose of 20 mSv per year;

An equivalent dose to a fetus of 20 mSv for the full period of in utero development.

Decision making on lifting or adapting protective actions, including the determination of what protective actions may need to be lifted or adapted, when the protective actions may need to be lifted or adapted and to whom the decision may apply;

Implementation of activities to enable the transition from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation by providing a basis to guide simple activities aimed at reducing the residual dose.

The level of protection offered by the types of buildings used for sheltering (shielding factor and tightness against diffusion of outside atmosphere);

The need for continued simultaneous implementation of iodine thyroid blocking when appropriate;

The medical care and other needs of those sheltered (e.g. the availability of medicines, food supplies, clean clothing and sanitation);

Any necessity to gradually increase the time recommended for members of the public to spend outdoors until sheltering is fully lifted, with account taken of the need for any instructions to be given on areas to be avoided while outdoors;

The need for further protective actions based on generic criteria and OILs to replace sheltering (e.g. evacuation or relocation).

In an evacuated area where the monitoring results indicate that the projected doses may exceed the generic criteria for relocation (i.e. the measurement results exceed OIL2 of GSG-2 [5]), evacuation should be substituted by relocation to provide better living conditions for evacuees.

In an evacuated area where the monitoring results indicate that the projected doses do not exceed the generic criteria for relocation (i.e. the measurement results do not exceed OIL2 of GSG-2 [5]), evacuation should be lifted if no or only limited restrictions (e.g. restrictions on locally produced food or limited access to certain recreational areas) would continue to be necessary for those people living normally in the area and if the preconditions in para. 4.101 are fulfilled.

In an evacuated area where the monitoring results indicate that the projected doses do not exceed the generic criteria for relocation (i.e. the measurement results do not exceed OIL2 of GSG-2 [5]), but limited restrictions are not sufficient for the protection of the people returning to live normally in the area, or the preconditions in para. 4.101 are not fulfilled, evacuation should not be lifted until this area can be managed as an existing exposure situation, after fulfilment of the prerequisites in Section 3 and of the preconditions in para. 4.101.³⁵

Infrastructure and public services are in place (e.g. public transportation, shops and markets, schools, nurseries, health care facilities, police and firefighting services, water services, sanitation, energy supplies, telecommunication networks).

Clear instructions and advice on the restrictions still in place and the recommended changes to behaviours and habits, including land use, have been provided to those returning.

Public support centre(s) and informational material (e.g. leaflets, posters) for public reassurance and psychosocial support are available to those returning.

A strategy has been established for the restoration of workplaces and for the provision of social support.

Information on the likely evolution of the exposure situation and the associated health hazards has been provided to those returning.

Relevant employees of operating organizations (those employed directly by the operating organization and those engaged indirectly through a contractor) engaged in an emergency response on the site, including in the activities aimed at enabling the termination of the emergency;

Relevant personnel from other response organizations and services, such as response managers, rescuers, firefighters, drivers and crews of evacuation vehicles, medical personnel, law enforcement personnel, members of monitoring teams, members of decontamination teams, and workers engaged in various activities on the site and off the site, including the restoration of essential infrastructure and the management of waste generated in the emergency;

Relevant personnel engaged in providing support and care to the affected population (e.g. in reception centres).

Inform emergency workers of their rights, duties and responsibilities with regard to occupational radiation protection;

Recognize the organizations’ responsibilities, commitments and duties as employers in occupational radiation protection, so that those responsibilities, commitments and duties can be effectively discharged at the preparedness stage and in the transition phase.

What type of work helpers are permitted to be engaged in during the transition phase and the type of training the helpers will need to safely and effectively carry out this work;

A mechanism for the helpers’ engagement (e.g. where and how volunteers from the public may express their interest and willingness to help, how the willingness to help will be documented, what information and instructions the helpers will be provided with, and which organization(s) or tasks they will be assigned to);

The process for informing helpers about and training them in their rights, duties and responsibilities.

Large variations in the radiological conditions expected within the affected area in an emergency exposure situation, warranting the simultaneous application of different measures for the protection of emergency workers and helpers;

Severe radiological conditions having been present at the site for a longer period and, thus, challenging the on-site response efforts;

Different exposure situations existing simultaneously in different areas, warranting workers undertaking the same work to be subject to different dose restrictions;

Large numbers of emergency workers involved from different organizations and services with diverse backgrounds, knowledge and expertise, some of whom might not have been identified and designated as emergency workers in advance of the emergency;

Numerous members of the public volunteering to help.

The dose from external exposure to strongly penetrating radiation for H_p(10). Doses from external exposure to weakly penetrating radiation and from intake or skin contamination need to be prevented by all possible means. If prevention is not feasible, the effective dose and the RBE (relative biological effectiveness) weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ have to be limited to minimize the health risk to the individual in line with the risk associated with the guidance values given here.

The total effective dose (E) and the RBE weighted absorbed dose to a tissue or organ (AD_T) via all exposure pathways (i.e. dose from external exposure and committed dose from intakes), which are to be estimated as early as possible to enable any further exposure to be restricted as appropriate.

Encourage female workers to notify their employer of an actual or suspected pregnancy;

Inform female workers who are or who might be pregnant of the associated health risks before they undertake the assigned work;

Assess and monitor the conditions in which female emergency workers who are or who might be pregnant may need to work;

Ensure that adequate protective equipment is provided to female emergency workers who are or who might be pregnant, and ensure that they are trained in its use;

Assess the equivalent dose to the embryo or fetus after the emergency work as a basis for determining whether the further involvement of the female emergency worker needs to be restricted and whether medical consultation is warranted.

Register the emergency workers and helpers engaged in the emergency response;

Continuously monitor hazardous conditions in which emergency workers and helpers are to perform their duties;

Comprehensively plan the expected work in an emergency response, while accounting for the hazardous conditions present and the time needed to complete the work;

Assess the total effective dose and the relative biological effectiveness (RBE) weighted absorbed doses to a tissue or organ for emergency workers and helpers via all exposure pathways, as appropriate;

Record the doses received;

Communicate to emergency workers and helpers in plain and understandable language the doses they receive, and place the associated health hazards in perspective.

The needs for training and for personal protective and monitoring equipment;

The need to implement iodine thyroid blocking and/or provide adequate personal protective equipment to emergency workers against the inhalation of radioactive iodine and other radionuclides in cases of prolonged working activities in the transition phase;

Tasks during which emergency workers may be subject to exposures exceeding occupational dose limits;

To whom employers need to provide comprehensive information on the risk involved as a basis for obtaining informed consent;

The need for regular health surveillance to assess the initial and continued fitness of emergency workers for their intended duties.

Emergency workers not designated in advance and helpers might not have had any recognized rights and duties in relation to occupational radiation protection before their involvement and thus might not have received any training in radiation protection.

The employers of emergency workers not designated in advance might not have the capacity to discharge their responsibilities, duties and commitments in the occupational radiation protection of these workers.

Helpers will not have an employer who would provide for their protection.

No assessment of the health condition (i.e. fitness for duty) of emergency workers not designated in advance and of helpers may be possible before they undertake emergency work.

Instructions on the duties assigned and how to carry out those duties under the assessed conditions;

Information on the health risks associated with performing these duties;

The protective measures available and how they should be implemented effectively.

Adjusting the implementation of the protection strategy on the basis of actual circumstances, including the adaptation or lifting of specific protective actions;

Identifying measures necessary for protecting emergency workers and helpers;

Identifying those individuals to be registered and needing longer term medical follow-up;

Decision making on the termination of the emergency; (e) Planning for long term recovery within the new exposure situation.

External exposure from radionuclides deposited on the ground;

Internal exposure due to ingestion of radionuclides incorporated in food, milk and drinking water;

Internal exposure due to inhalation of resuspended radionuclides.

The organizations, expert bodies, local and national laboratories, private institutes, universities and research centres responsible for implementing the monitoring strategy;

The availability of human resources and technical capabilities (including monitoring equipment and dose assessment tools) in each of these entities for implementing the monitoring strategy;

Mechanisms for ensuring the comparability and consistency of measurements and for their interpretation, including training, quality management and intercomparison exercises;

An organization designated as responsible for the validation, recording and retention of monitoring results and assessments;

A mechanism for incorporating monitoring results and assessments into the decision making processes.

Guidelines for effective diagnosis and treatment;

Designation of medical personnel trained in clinical management of radiation injuries;

Designation of institutions for evaluating radiation exposure (external and internal), for providing specialized medical treatment and for longer term medical actions;

Criteria for identifying the individuals referred to in para. 4.159 and for their registration (see appendix II to GSR Part 7 [2] and GSG-2 [5]).

A registry has been established of those individuals who have been identified, by the time the emergency is to be terminated, as requiring longer term medical follow-up, on the basis of criteria established in table II.1 and table II.2 of GSR Part 7 [2] (see also GSG-2 [5] for further details).

A programme for longer term medical follow-up for registered individuals has been established.

For the transition to an existing exposure situation, a strategy for mental health and psychosocial support of the affected population has been developed.

To provide for the long term medical care of individuals who have suffered deterministic effects and of individuals incurring doses that exceed the threshold dose for deterministic effects;

To provide for the early detection and diagnosis of stochastic effects (e.g. thyroid cancer) among the exposed population in order to allow for effective treatment.

The initial duration of the medical follow-up;

The management of the information and the reporting and sharing of results;

The identification of medical specialists to be involved in the medical follow-up;

The management of biological and non-biological samples;

The management of mental health and psychosocial consequences;

Ethical and cost–benefit aspects.

Responsibilities for radioactive waste management during and after an emergency should be allocated clearly and consistently, to the extent possible, within the national policy and strategy for radioactive waste management.

Responsibilities for the management of conventional waste and conditions under which conventional waste arising from the emergency and from emergency response actions will be managed should be agreed on (see paras 4.186–4.189).

A mechanism should be established to coordinate the development of various arrangements by responsible organizations at the preparedness stage as well as to coordinate, under the unified command and control system (see para. 5.7 of GSR Part 7 [2]), the management of radioactive waste and conventional waste during the emergency response.

The characteristics and volume of the radioactive waste to be generated in postulated nuclear or radiological emergencies should be identified, to the extent possible, on the basis of the hazard assessment, with account taken of past experience.

Guidance should be prepared for the characterization and classification of radioactive waste. The guidance should take into account the diversity of radiological, chemical, physical, mechanical and biological properties of the waste likely to be generated in a range of postulated emergencies, in accordance with the applicable regulations and guidance on radioactive waste management. This guidance should comply with the applicable regulations and guidance on radioactive waste management.

Guidance should be prepared for the handling of conventional waste and radioactive waste during an emergency. The guidance should describe the acceptance criteria of existing storage or disposal facilities to be applied to waste generated in the emergency. Guidance should also be given on measures for the management of waste that deviates from the acceptance criteria of existing facilities. This guidance should comply with the applicable regulations and guidance on the management of conventional waste and of radioactive waste.

Methodologies should be developed for the initiation of predisposal management activities for radioactive waste (e.g. segregation, packaging, transport, storage) in a timely and appropriate manner following the emergency. As part of these methodologies:

Limitations of available options and resources should be identified and well understood by all interested parties, and mechanisms for requesting and obtaining international assistance should be determined.

Feasible options for the minimization of radioactive waste (e.g. clearance, reuse, recycling) should be identified.

Necessary tools, equipment, procedures, training, drills and exercises to support effective waste management should be identified and put in place.

Consideration should be given to the interdependencies among various steps in the predisposal management of radioactive waste as well as to the impact of waste management decisions on future disposal options [41].

National experience in radioactive waste management;

Acceptable waste collection points and their characteristics;

The characteristics of acceptable storage sites, such as geographical, physical and demographic aspects, as well as the proximity to the affected site or area and the availability of the necessary public infrastructure;

The need for the transport of radioactive waste, adherence to transport regulations [47] and any deviation from established practices, as necessary.

Identification of common religious practices and cultural practices within the State;

Identification of possible management options applicable to the identified practices and the type of contamination (internal or on the surface of the remains);

Consultation on what management options may be acceptable with the relevant interested parties, including representatives of different religious groups;

Training of workers assigned to handle the remains in accordance with basic radiation protection principles, including ways of preventing the spread of radionuclides and their inadvertent ingestion.

“The termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency…shall include prior consultation with interested parties, as appropriate” (para. 5.97 of GSR 7 Part [2]).

“The government shall ensure that, as part of its emergency preparedness, arrangements are in place for the termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency.… The planning process shall include as appropriate: …Arrangements for consultation of interested parties” (para. 5.100 of GSR 7 Part [2]).

“Adjustment of protective actions and other response actions and of other arrangements that are aimed at enabling the termination of an emergency shall be made by a formal process that includes consultation of interested parties” (para. 5.95 of GSR 7 Part [2]).

The objectives of the consultation;

The targeted interested parties;

Applicable legal and regulatory requirements;

Time frames for effective consultation;

Relevant documents to be published or otherwise made publicly available;

Ways in which interested parties may comment, directly or through representative consultative bodies, on relevant documents;

Possibilities for communicating with interested parties through public meetings, formal hearings and other appropriate means of consultation;

Arrangements for reviewing and assessing the result of the consultation;

Provisions to consider the result of the consultation in the decision making processes.

“The operating organization and response organizations shall identify the knowledge, skills and abilities necessary to perform the functions [for emergency response]” (para. 6.28 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The government shall ensure that personnel relevant for emergency response shall take part in regular training, drills and exercises to ensure that they are able to perform their assigned response functions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency” (Requirement 25 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“Exercise programmes shall be developed and implemented to ensure that all specified functions…for emergency response [and] all organizational interfaces…are tested at suitable intervals” (para. 6.30 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

“The operating organization and response organizations shall make arrangements to review and evaluate responses in actual events and in exercises, in order to record the areas in which improvements are necessary and to ensure that the necessary improvements are made” (para 6.38 of GSR Part 7 [2]).

The generic criteria established in GSR Part 7 [2] for enabling the transition to an existing exposure situation (see para. 4.64);

A ‘ground’ exposure scenario in which it is assumed that, in the affected area, all members of the public, including those most vulnerable to radiation exposure, such as children and pregnant women, will be living normally⁵⁰ and that the lifting of restrictions on food, milk or drinking water will be implemented through the use of OIL6 [5]⁵¹ (see Table 3);

All individuals being exposed;

The contribution from all relevant radionuclides and their progenies;

The contribution from all relevant exposure pathways;

Any behaviour of the radioactive material that will have a significant impact on the OIL value;

The relevant effective dose (annual) and, as appropriate, calculations of the organ dose (annual or for the full period of in utero development);

The response of monitoring instruments;

Relevant operational requirements (e.g. usability of OILs under field conditions);

The overall protection strategy.

OIL_T,LWR is 4.8 µSv/h ambient dose equivalent rate above gamma background at 1 m above ground level.⁵³

OIL_T,Cs-137 is 4.8 µSv/h ambient dose equivalent rate above gamma background at 1 m above ground level.

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Legal Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (1987).

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7, IAEA, Vienna (2015).

EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Arrangements for Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-G-2.1, IAEA, Vienna (2007).

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident: Report by the Director General, IAEA, Vienna (2015).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Fukushima Daiichi Accident, Technical Volume 3/5: Emergency Preparedness and Response, IAEA, Vienna (2015).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Radiological Accident in Nueva Aldea, IAEA, Vienna (2009).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, OECD–IAEA Paks Fuel Project: Final Report, IAEA, Vienna (2010).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Radiological Accident in Lia, Georgia, IAEA, Vienna (2014).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Investigation of an Accidental Exposure of Radiotherapy Patients in Panama: Report of a Team of Experts, 26 May–1 June 2001, IAEA, Vienna (2001).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Radiological Accident in Goiânia, IAEA, Vienna (1988).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The International Chernobyl Project: Technical Report, IAEA, Vienna (1991).

BENNETT, B., REPACHOLI, M., CARR, Z. (Eds), Health Effects of the Chernobyl Accident and Special Health Care Programmes: Report of the UN Chernobyl Forum Expert Group “Health”, World Health Organization, Geneva (2006).

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Island Accident by Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Rep. NUREG-0600, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, DC (1979).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Remediation Process for Areas Affected by Past Activities and Accidents, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-3.1, IAEA, Vienna (2007). (A revision of this publication is in preparation.)

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-8, IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Assessment for the Decommissioning of Facilities Using Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-5.2, IAEA, Vienna (2008).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Decommissioning of Nuclear Power Plants, Research Reactors and Other Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-47, IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Communication with the Public in a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Public Communications 2012, IAEA, Vienna (2012).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Method for Developing a Communication Strategy and Plan for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Public Communication Plan 2015, IAEA, Vienna (2015).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/ Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION–INTERPOL, UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, IAEA Safety Glossary: Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection: 2016 Revision, IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007 Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Publication 103, Elsevier, Oxford (2007).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Governmental, Legal and Regulatory Framework for Safety, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 1 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (2016).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Application of the Commission’s Recommendations for the Protection of People in Emergency Exposure Situations, Publication 109, Elsevier, Oxford (2009).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Application of the Commission’s Recommendations to the Protection of People Living in Long-term Contaminated Areas after a Nuclear Accident or a Radiation Emergency, Publication 111, Elsevier, Oxford (2009).

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Iodine Thyroid Blocking: Guidelines for Use in Planning for and Responding to Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies, WHO, Geneva (2017).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Actions to Protect the Public in an Emergency due to Severe Conditions at a Light Water Reactor, EPR-NPP Public Protective Actions 2013, IAEA, Vienna (2013).

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality, 4th edn, WHO, Geneva (2011).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, JOINT FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION / INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY DIVISION OF NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Radionuclide Activity Concentrations for Food and Drinking Water, IAEA-TECDOC-1788, IAEA, Vienna (2016).

General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed of 1995, as last amended 2013, Codex Alimentarius Commission, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/agns/pdf/CXS_193e.pdf

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Occupational Radiation Protection, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-7, IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental and Source Monitoring for Purposes of Radiation Protection, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.8, IAEA, Vienna (2005).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Generic Procedures for Medical Response during a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Medical 2005, IAEA, Vienna (2005).

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, mhGAP Humanitarian Intervention Guide (mhGAP-HIG): Clinical Management of Mental, Neurological and Substance Use Conditions in Humanitarian Emergencies, WHO, Geneva (2015).

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WAR TRAUMA FOUNDATION, WORLD VISION INTERNATIONAL, Psychological First Aid: Guide for Field Workers, WHO, Geneva (2011).

INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMMITTEE, IASC Guidelines on Mental Health and Psychosocial Support in Emergency Settings, IASC, Geneva (2007).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 5, IAEA, Vienna (2009).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-41, IAEA, Vienna (2016).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-40, IAEA, Vienna (2016).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Predisposal Management of Radioactive Waste from the Use of Radioactive Material in Medicine, Industry, Agriculture, Research and Education, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSG-45, IAEA, Vienna (in preparation).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Classification of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-1, IAEA, Vienna (2009).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Disposal of Radioactive Waste, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-5, IAEA, Vienna (2011).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2012 Edition, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR-6, IAEA, Vienna (2012).

Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 29th July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982 (the Paris Convention).

Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28th January 1964 and by the Protocol of 16th November 1982 (the Brussels Supplementary Convention).

Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, INFCIRC/500, IAEA, Vienna (1996).

Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention, INFCIRC/402, IAEA, Vienna (1992).

Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, INFCIRC/566, IAEA, Vienna (1998).

Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, INFCIRC/567, IAEA, Vienna (1998).

Protocol to Amend the Paris Convention on Nuclear Third Party Liability (2004 Protocol to the Paris Convention).

Protocol to Amend the Brussels Supplementary Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (2004 Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operational Intervention Levels for Reactor Emergencies, and Methodology for Their Derivation, EPR-NPP-OILs 2017, IAEA, Vienna (2017).

Actions for the restoration of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant from the effects of the accident;

Actions relating to the area evacuated on the basis of plant conditions within a 20 km radius of the nuclear power plant (restricted area);

Actions relating to the area from which people were relocated (deliberate evacuation area);

Actions relating to the area in which people were advised to shelter (evacuation prepared area);

Actions to ensure the safety and reassurance of those affected;

Actions to secure employment and to provide support for farms and industries;

Actions to support the local municipalities in the affected areas;

Actions relating to compensation of sufferers, affected businesses, etc.;

Actions to assist those returning to areas that had been evacuated.

A thyroid examination of children aged 18 and younger (target population: around 380 000);

Comprehensive medical check-ups of evacuees (210 000);

A survey of the mental health and lifestyle of the same evacuees;

A survey of pregnant women and nursing mothers (approximately 15 000 each year) [I–11].

The projected annual dose to the public is lower than the criterion of 20 mSv;

Preparation for the implementation of long term protective actions has been made;

A framework has been developed for the participation of the relevant local governments and residents in the decision making process for long term protective actions.

The safety status of the nuclear power plant;

A decrease in the dose rate;

Restoration of the public service functions and infrastructure.

To reduce the additional radiation dose to 1 mSv/year or lower over the long term;

To reduce the additional annual radiation dose the public is exposed to by around 50% (including the physical attenuation of radioactive materials) by the end of August 2013 from the level at the end of August 2011; and

To reduce the additional annual radiation dose affecting children by around 60% (including the physical attenuation of radioactive materials) by the end of August 2013 from the level at the end of August 2011 by decontaminating the living environment of children, such as schools, playgrounds, etc., on a priority basis, since it is crucial to recover the environment under which children can live safely and securely.

Detailed monitoring to characterize the exposure situation and exposure pathways;

Arrangements for the implementation of long term health surveillance;

Determination of the criteria for the termination of protective measures;

Formalization of the long term management of radioactive waste;

Adjustment of arrangements for the protection of emergency workers, other workers and helpers, both on and off the site;

Re-evaluation and rearrangement of areas in which protective actions were in place;

Establishment of long term plans for decontamination;

Announcement that control of the situation had been regained at the plant.

Choice of a suitable disposal site;

Design and construction of waste containers;

Collection of heavy machinery, such as excavators and back- and front-loaders;

Update of written operational procedures;

Testing of various decontamination techniques; (f) Preparation of a work timetable.

Organizing the management structure for the recovery operations;

Re-evaluating or setting dosimetric criteria and operational criteria for implementing relevant work;

Assessing and gathering the resources needed;

Mapping the geographical distribution of the contamination;

Developing and writing procedures for access control, equipment QA/QC and the selection of health screening methods (cytogenetic and other blood tests);

Choosing a suitable location for the disposal of waste;

Defining specifications for waste containers;

Setting up an environmental monitoring network;

Developing a public communication strategy.

Separation of the refuelling pit with the damaged cleaning tank and the spent fuel pool from the reactor;

Increase of the boric acid concentration in the refuelling pit to 20 g/kg;

Development of the safety borating system for the cleaning tank;

Construction of an independent cooling system for the cleaning tank;

Separation of the refuelling pit from the spent fuel pool;

Installation of redundant temperature, coolant level and neutron measurement instrumentation in order to provide the refuelling pit with an independently operated instrumentation and control system;

Detailed visual exploration of the state and geometry of the damaged fuel assemblies and the cleaning tank.

A few hundred TBq of noble gases, mostly ¹³³Xe (half-life of 5.2 days): see Fig. I–7;

A few tenths of a TBq of radioiodine, mostly ¹³¹I (half-life of 8 days): see Fig. I–8;

Less than 0.01 TBq of other radionuclides, principally ¹³⁴Cs (half-life of 2 years) and ¹³⁷Cs (half-life of 30 years): see Fig. I–9.

The emergency classification scheme was revised to ensure that it covered all potential alert events and emergencies at the Paks nuclear power plant. The classification scheme included emergency action levels and readiness action levels⁴ based on measured parameters. A comprehensive review of the plant hazard assessment was conducted to ensure that all potential accident sequences had been identified.

The site emergency response plan was revised to include a procedure that took account of the revised emergency classification scheme and postulated emergency scenarios.

The internal regulation on technological modifications at the Paks nuclear power plant was revised to ensure that the regulation covered interactions between the site emergency response plan and the impact of planned modifications. With this revision, it was necessary to conduct an analysis of the emergency related aspects of planned modifications before any decision on such modifications could be made.

Verification and/or validation of the new Paks Release and Environmental Monitoring System related to critical parameters for emergency detection and classification was conducted. Actions were then taken to improve the system to better support emergency alert and notification activities.

The emergency preparedness section and all contractors were required to participate in preparatory training for operative personnel on new safety relevant activities.

The competent organization of the Paks nuclear power plant, which was responsible for the general management of emergency preparedness, was also involved in the assessment of the contractors’ emergency procedures.

The involvement of dosimetry control staff in the conduct of unanticipated drills or exercises.

In addition, the Paks nuclear power plant decided to ensure that:

Emergency kits (containing gas masks, iodine tablets, breathing equipment, firefighters’ clothes and personal dosimeters) for operating personnel would be available in each operational room;

Field training on the application of breathing apparatus (for respiratory protection) would be adopted in relevant procedures for urgent protective actions;

Training and field first aid tasks would be completed by facility fire brigade personnel.

Ensure the subcriticality and cooling of the fuel debris structure.

Decontaminate the internal surfaces of the primary circuit.

Re-establish conditions for conducting refuelling.

Ensure safe conditions for the long term storage of fuel debris.